Setting forth the criteria of the Just War Tradition (JWT) can be relatively simple and straightforward, as evidenced by the abundance of treatments, secular and religious, that purport to present the tradition in the space of a few hundred words. The criteria of the tradition can be summarized as follows:

There are, however, several difficulties with simplistic presentations of the criteria. First, in spite of the fact that the tradition is frequently presented as a "theory," there is no set, agreed upon, universally recognized "theory" of just war. Different thinkers and different eras describe the criteria of the tradition differently. Some, for example, follow the US Catholic Bishops who in their 1983 pastoral letter, The Challenge of Peace, identify a criterion of "comparative justice." Others might add "proportionality" as a distinct criterion of justice in going to war.

Second, even the widely acknowledged criteria like those listed above are subject to debate regarding exactly how they are properly understood and implemented.

Third, the tradition is a living effort. It continues to evolve in the face of new realities. For example, there is today significant pressure to broaden the criterion of "legitimate authority" from its traditional locus in a national ruler to encompass the requirement of international authorization. Likewise, the reality that future wars are likely to include not only wars fought between recognizable national bodies but also may include wars fought between a nation and a more elusive, decentralized, international or at least non-national entity challenges traditional renderings of various criteria.

Two Just War Traditions

In addition to these difficulties, there is another more significant reason that commonplace presentations of the tradition are problematic. Namely, they assume that just war as a Christian discipline, as a form of discipleship, is no different from popular, secular renditions of the tradition. This is to say, it is taken for granted that what I will call the modern, legalistic "check-list" approach to just war is synonymous with the just war discipline that was nurtured and developed by Christian leaders and theologians such as Augustine, Aquinas, and Vitoria for the sake of guiding the Christian community in its life and witness in the world.

In fact, there is both significant overlap and divergence between the two approaches to the JWT. In the account of criteria that follows, I will highlight some of those similarities and differences and suggest the difference the differences make for Christian reflection on and practice of just war. I begin by setting forth rather starkly, the basic difference between the two approaches.

Just war as a form of Christian discipleship has as it primary frame of reference the Christian community. By this I mean that the JWT developed as a guideline for how Christians embody love of neighbor in the midst of warfare. It developed as an extension of the character of the Christian community, of the community's on-going, day-to-day concern for justice and love of neighbor in the whole of its life. In other words, the Christian community engages in just war as a natural expression of its daily concern for its neighbors, for peace and justice.

What this emphasis on character means is that a people who are not virtuous, who are not committed to justice and genuine concern for their neighbor in their daily life, could not wage a war justly, even if there was a just cause, because they lack the character required to wage war justly. After all, under the stresses of warfare, a people who lack the requisite character will not be able to sustain the discipline that the criteria outline.

Just war as a legalistic check-list has as its frame of reference nation-states and international law. It presupposes no particular community. Likewise, character matters little. Anyone - regardless of their character, of whether they truly care about justice - may invoke the tradition. As long as I can check off each criterion, I may wage a just war. It matters little if my character is just or loving; it matters little if my intent in war is consistent with or grows out of an on-going, day-to-day concern with justice and love of neighbor. Indeed, I may be thoroughly vicious, but so long as I can check off each of the criteria, I can wage a war and call it just.

What difference does this distinction make? Generally speaking, when the JWT is no longer understood as a practice that grows out of the character of a community and it becomes a legalistic checklist that any scoundrel can use, Christians - and the tradition - become that much more vulnerable to manipulation by those who are adept at invoking the language of just war as a cover for wars driven by something other than a genuine concern for neighbor and justice. More concretely, as we shall see, when the tradition is used as a check-list disconnected from issues of character, the criteria lose much of their force. The discipline becomes much more lax and permissive.

The Criteria

1. Legitimate Authority

At the first level, legitimate authority refers to who may wage a war. The Christian tradition has long held that God alone has authority over life and death, and the just war tradition holds that God shares that authority with the prince, the head of state (cf. Romans 13:1ff.). Thus, the JWT holds that heads of state made wage war. It is worth noting that, to date, the tradition has not required international authorization, although there is increasing pressure in that direction and as the tradition develops it may indeed incorporate such an expectation.

Note that one expectation of a just war is that the legitimate authority will actually declare war. That a war be declared is important in that it provides the enemy with clarity regarding conditions under which the fighting will stop.

At a second level, legitimate authority concerns who determines if a particular war is just. The modern, legalistic approach basically states that the ruler decides. Here is one point where that approach differs from the Christian tradition. The Christian tradition is more complicated, involving three points of decision. First, the prince, in consultation with wise advisors, determines the justness of a war. The assumption here is that the head of state is the office particularly charged with looking after the common good. And this is a matter as much of character as information.

Second, individual soldiers bear some level of responsibility for deciding on the justness of a war. Specifically, soldiers owe the prince the benefit of a doubt. They should defer to the head of state, unless they are sure the war is unjust, in which case they should refuse to fight. Third, the church bears responsibility for deciding on the justness of a war. Indeed, as the JWT developed, it entailed the church holding Christian princes and Christian soldiers accountable for the discipline.

2. Just Cause

Here the focus is on the enemy's behavior. Just cause has traditionally been spelled out in terms of the defense of an innocent third party, understood either as coming to the aid of an unjustly attacked neighbor or a government's defense of its own populace from unjust attack. In this regard, the JWT has not sanctioned self-defense. Indeed, the great thinkers of the JWT within Christianity were clear that the JWT did not sanction personal, lethal self-defense.

Here the tradition treats the issue of preventative and preemptive war. The bulk of the tradition prohibits preemptive strikes. However, there is a minor strand that permits preemptive strike in extremis, if the threat is both imminent and grave (the very survival of nation is at risk). A preventative war (one based on a threat that is not imminent, but speculative or merely possible at some point in the future) is absolutely prohibited.

3. Right Intention

Here the focus is on the would-be just warrior's behavior. And it is here that the difference between the two traditions - Christian and legalistic check-list - can be seen clearly.

The legalistic check-list approach reduces right intent to what might be called an "unreflective peace" and a disavowal of revenge. In other words, the criterion is met when a potential warring party asserts they desire peace and not revenge. Questions of character, consistency and the selective appeal to the tradition are not raised.

In contrast, just war as Christian discipleship involves a thicker account of right intent, revolving around issues of character, which is seen in three ways. First, right intent is a matter of a "just peace." As Augustine noted long ago, everyone desires peace; wars are always fought for peace - for a peace that better suits the aggressor. Hence, it is not sufficient to be for peace. One must intend a peace that is truly just, and not merely self-serving.

Second, right intent entails that even in warfare we love our enemy. Anger is permitted, but not hatred. The JWT does not exempt Christians from loving their enemy neighbor. Indeed, in waging war, the right intent is not to destroy the enemy but to bring the benefits of a just peace to the enemy.

Third, right intent entails what can be called "complete justice." How does one measure something as evasive as intent? Intent is evaluated by considering character and consistency. Thus, evaluating intent with regard to war might entail asking: Is this a people who characteristically and consistently seek justice? Is justice only selectively enforced? Is it carried out to completion? Complete justice entails looking forward - how justice will be implemented - and backwards - bringing the past before the bar of justice. In this regard, right intent is related to Matthew 7:5: "First take the log out of your own eye, and then you will see clearly to take the speck out of your neighbor's eye." Thus, right intent may involve confessing one's own complicity in past injustice as one confronts present injustice. This thicker understanding of right intent as complete justice provides space for considerations of "exit-strategies," of justice after the shooting stops as well.

4. Last Resort

This criterion is pretty straight forward. The resort to arms can never be a first response to aggression; rather it must always be a last resort, after other feasible means of resolving the dispute (mediation, negotiation, arbitration, international tribunals, etc) have failed. This, of course, is a judgment call. But implicit in the criteria is a commitment to diplomacy in good faith, even if one's opponent apparently is not engaged in good faith diplomacy.

5. Probability of Success

This criterion means that the goals of a stated war must be attainable. One can only enter into war if there is a likelihood of success. For example, if one has a just cause but clearly cannot win a war, then one is not justified in going to war. In such a situation, one must find other ways short of war to resist or address the injustice.

Closely related to the likelihood of success is the principle that a just war is a limited war for a limited end. A just war is waged to address a particular, declared injustice. Just wars are not waged to wipe out an ideology, to rid the world of evil or attain absolute security. Such goals are neither limited nor attainable. Accordingly, such goals are characteristic of a crusade, not a just war.

Under the heading of probability of success questions concerning the cost of success may also be raised (what traditionally identified as "proportionality" and is sometimes considered a distinct criterion). When considering waging war, one should consider the risks and harms attendant to warfare, including further destabilization of world, increased insecurity, the sacrifice of other values in the pursuit of war, the cost in terms of life and resources, etc. The tradition is clear: if the cost of warfare exceeds the cost of enduring the injustice, one may be obliged to refrain from waging war.

6. Non-Combatant Immunity / Discrimination

This is the first of the criteria that deals with justice in the conduct of warfare. It establishes that one cannot intentionally or directly kill noncombatants. Although the criterion is typically stated in this negative form; it can be stated positively. This criterion condemns civilian deaths that occur due to sheer lack of concern or neglect of the criterion, or out of negligence. In other words, the criterion suggests that one has a positive duty to distinguish civilians from soldiers.

There are several dimensions to this criterion. First, it addresses the matter of targets. One cannot target civilians for the sake of reducing combatant losses. (Fighting a war justly may mean more soldiers die, that the war lasts longer and is more costly than if it were fought unjustly). One cannot legitimately target the civilian infrastructure. Note that politicians are legitimate targets, whereas soldiers on leave and POW's are not.

At the level of targeting, a difference may appear between the Christian discipline and the legalistic check-list to the extent that the Christian discipline may grant the benefit of a doubt to civilians, whereas the legalistic check-list tends to favor the military. This is to say, the Christian discipline declares civilian infrastructure off limits as long as its primary use is indeed civilian. The legalistic check-list favors the military in that it tends to sanction targeting civilian infrastructure if that infrastructure is a matter of dual use - used by both civilian and military personnel.

Having said this, it is important to note that international law maintains a very rigorous standard with regard to water facilities and cultural / religious sites, saying that such sites cannot be attacked even if used by the enemy military, unless the enemy is actually using such sites to launch an attack.

Second, non-combatant immunity impacts choice of weaponry. Some weapons may be intrinsically indiscriminate and therefore unjust. Weapons that may fall into the category may include cluster bombs and land mines (unless they deactivate), and various forms of weapons of mass destruction - the very name suggesting they are indiscriminate. Some weapons may be unjust in particular contexts, like a densely populated urban setting. Likewise, some tactics have been declared unjust on the grounds that they violate the criterion of discrimination - carpet bombing, or declaring entire cities a single military target, for example.

Here again, the Christian discipline may prove more rigorous than the legalistic check-list insofar as the secular version of the JWT tends to relax this criterion by suggesting that all it means is that one is to use the most discriminating weapon you have.

Third, discrimination addresses the issue of the location of military installations. Inherent in this criterion is the obligation to respect not only the enemy civilian population by distinguishing between it and legitimate military targets but also one's own population by not locating military installations in midst of civilian populations, thus putting them at risk.

Here too there may be significant differences in the way Christian and the secular legalistic versions embody this. The modern secular version tends to weaken the criterion by shifting responsibility for violations to the enemy. This is to say, there is a tendency to excuse violations of the criterion when the enemy violates it, say by using human shields or by locating a military installation in the midst of a civilian population. However, the proper response to the use of such shields is not simply to attack and blame the enemy, but to use of more precise/discriminating weaponry and tactics.

Lastly, the prohibition of torture falls under the heading of discrimination. The JWT prohibits the mistreatment of civilians as well as captured enemy combatants.

7. Proportionality

The final criterion insists that the means used in the prosecution of a war must be proportional to the ends. On one hand, this means that any intended destruction inflicted on the enemy must serve the stated ends of the just cause. For example, you cannot destroy an enemy battalion simply because you can and because you want to see your enemy weakened for the foreseeable future. Rather, that destruction must be related to the purpose of the war. This criterion prohibits wiping out a routed enemy at the war's conclusion (unless the route is only a retreat for the sake of regrouping to continue the battle).

On the other hand, proportionality insists that the actual means used do not exceed the force necessary to attain the proper end. In other words, the criterion prohibits "overkill," using disproportionate force, a hammer to kill a fly.

Conclusion

Because the JWT is a living tradition, the meaning of each of the criteria will remain a matter of dispute and discernment, especially as evolving forms of warfare present new challenges. Underlying these conversations, however, may rest a more fundamental decision: Will the Christian community engage the tradition as a form of discipleship? Will it embrace the costly discipline it entails as an expression not merely of an occasional, selective concern for neighbor and justice, but rather as an extension of the character of communities that love and seek justice for their neighbors consistently throughout the whole of their lives, in war and peace.

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Note: A more extensive treatment of the tradition along the lines presented here, including questions for discussion, is available at http://www.ekklesiaproject.org as a pamphlet entitled, "Just War as Christian Discipleship."
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This article is posted as part of a project on "The Theology of Peace and War ". For further information, go to http://www.mupwj.org/theologyofpeaceandwar.htm. Or contact Methodists United for Peace with Justice at 1500 16th Street, NW, Washington, D.C.20036 or at mupwj@mupwj.org.